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It is the every person’s daily phenome-
nal experience that conscious states rep-
resent their contents as occurring now.
Following Droege (2009) we could state
that consciousness has a peculiar affin-
ity for presence. Some researchers even
argue that conscious awareness necessarily
demands that mental content is somehow
held “frozen” within a discrete progres-
sive present moment (James, 1890; Lynds,
2003). Thus, phenomenal content seems
to beminimally conscious if it is integrated
into a single and coherent model of real-
ity during a “virtual window” of presence
(Metzinger, 2003; see also Brown, 1998;
Varela, 1999; Smythies, 2003).
In order to explain such features of con-
sciousness as phenomenal unity and conti-
nuity within the current present along with
a succession of discrete thoughts that give
rise to feeling of the past and future, a
reference to mechanisms outside the phe-
nomenal realm is necessary (Revonsuo,
2003). Thus, the question of what could
be the neurophysiological mechanisms
responsible for these experiences should be
addressed.
In this Opinion Article we shall build
our argument based on the biological real-
ism approach to consciousness proposed
by Revonsuo (2006). According to this
approach, subjective consciousness is a real
phenomenon that is tightly anchored to a
biological reality within the human brain.
Broadly speaking, the human brain is the
specific physical “location,” where the sub-
jective mental reality and the objective
neurobiological reality are intimately con-
nected along a unified metastable contin-
uum (Fingelkurts et al., 2009, 2013).
We have argued previously (Fingelkurts
et al., 2010) that phenomenal conscious-
ness refers to a higher level of organization
in the brain and captures all immediate
and undeniable (from the first-person per-
spective) phenomena of subjective experi-
ences (hearing, seeing, touching, feeling,
embodiment, moving, and thinking) that
present to any person right now (subjective
present) and right here (subjective space).
By this definition even remembering the
past images and planning the future events
can’t be performed other than in the
present moment and in relation to cur-
rent state of affairs (see also Lynds, 2003;
Droege, 2009). This is so because some-
one possesses phenomenal consciousness
if there is any type of subjective experi-
ences that is currently present for him/her
(Fingelkurts et al., 2010).
In this context what is presented as
now is not simply whatever sensory or
other representations occur in the brain at
any given moment but rather the spatial-
temporal hierarchy of selected and nested
metastable states of neuronal assemblies
that serve in real time as a basis for
the subjective experiences of the “present
moment.” Among many theories, the
Operational Architectonics (OA) theory of
brain and mind functioning (Fingelkurts
and Fingelkurts, 2001, 2008; Fingelkurts
et al., 2010, 2013) explicitly utilizes the
hierarchy of nested metastable states of
neuronal assemblies. In short, OA theory
is centered on the notion of operation.
Operation is broadly defined as the process
or state of being in effect and it has a begin-
ning and an end (Collins Essential English
Dictionary, 2006). In fact, everything
which can be represented by a process is an
operation. The notion of operation plays
a central role in bridging the brain-mind
gap and makes it possible to identify what
at the same time belongs to the mental
level and to the neurophysiological level
of brain activity organization, and acts as
a mediator between the two (Fingelkurts
and Fingelkurts, 2001, 2008; Benedetti
et al., 2010). Understanding of the opera-
tion as a process and considering its com-
binatorial nature, seems especially well
suited for describing and studying the
mechanisms of how information about
the objective physical entities of the exter-
nal world can be integrated within the
present moment in the internal subjec-
tive domain by means of entities of dis-
tributed neuronal assemblies (Fingelkurts
et al., 2010, 2013). In line with this concep-
tualization, simple cognitive operations
that present some partial aspect of the
whole object/scene/concept are presented
in the brain by local 3D-fields produced
by discrete and transient neuronal assem-
blies, which can be recorded by an elec-
troencephalogram (EEG) (Figures 1A,B).
More complex operations that constitute
the whole object or scene are brought
into existence by joint (synchronized) sim-
ple operations in the form of coupled
3D-fields—so called operational modules
(OMs) of varied complexity (Fingelkurts
and Fingelkurts, in press). Further syn-
chronization of several OMs (complex
field spatial-temporal patterns; Figure 1A)
forms even more coarse scales of nested
functional hierarchy (Feinberg, 2000) that
is now able to present and hold highly
complex sensorial inputs as coherent per-
ceptions of the world, create internal com-
plex images and form conscious deci-
sions (Fingelkurts et al., 2010, 2013). The
recombination of neuronal assemblies and
their operational modules into new con-
figurations gives rise to a nearly inex-
haustible source of presenting different
qualities, patterns, objects, scenes, con-
cepts and decisions.
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FIGURE 1 | Schematic representation of the nested functional hierarchy
of spatiotemporal patterns of 3D electromagnetic fields produced by
neuronal assemblies and operational modules formation, as well as
their dynamics. (A) In a nested hierarchy, higher levels are physically
composed of lower levels, and there is no central control of the system
resulting in weak constraint of higher upon lower levels. (B) Illustration of
the neuronal assembly’s dynamic and its relation to the EEG signal
segments (for methodological details see Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts,
2008, in press); RTP, rapid transitional processes. Local EEG signal (O1-left
occipital location) is filtered in alpha (7–13Hz) frequency band. (C) Diagram
depicting dynamics of operational modules (OMs). Phenomenological level
of description illustrates the ever-changing stream of consciousness, where
each momentarily stable pattern is a particular kaleidoscopic image
separated from one another by the transitive fringes (or rapid transitional
periods; RTPs). Neurophysiological level is presented by a relatively stable
complex OMs (outlined by the red line), that undergo abrupt changes
simultaneously with changes in phenomenological level. Such abrupt
changes marked as rapid transitional periods (RTPs). Gray shapes illustrate
simple OMs. This scheme is based on data published in Fingelkurts et al.
(2003). Methodological aspects of how 3D electromagnetic fields and their
combination in the form of operational modules are extracted from EEG
could be found in Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts (2008, in press).
In the following we will discuss how
the OA framework could implement the
subjective present and some other tem-
poral phenomena. We argue that at the
phenomenological level, the lasting OM
would be experienced as the “phenome-
nal present” of consciousness (Figure 1C).
This hypothesis remains to be proven
experimentally, however some empirical
evidence already exists. For example, the
mean duration of OMs (derived from
an EEG with a frequency band of 0.3–
30Hz) usually varies from 80–100ms for
large OMs spanning the cortex to 30 s for
small local OMs. These accounts, includ-
ing duration variation, are consistent with
known estimates for the frame of a specious
present, which varies from∼100ms to sev-
eral seconds depending on circumstances
(Pöppel, 1988).
However, if the brain could implement
only a complex but static OM, then such
a brain would only experience the pres-
ence of one unified world frozen into an
internal now (Metzinger, 2003). Neither
the complex texture of subjective time
flow, nor true perspectivalness that goes
along with a first-person point of view
would exist in such situation (Fingelkurts
et al., 2010). Therefore, a dynamic suc-
cession of phenomenal moments that
are integrated into the flow of subjec-
tive time is needed. Indeed, as it is evi-
dent from the first-person perspective, the
actualization of full-fledged phenomenal
objects, images or scenes is realized on
a “one-at-a-time” basis, moving serially
from one phenomenal pattern within a
specious present to another (Revonsuo,
2006). This process gives rise to a stream
of consciousness that is best conceptual-
ized in the James’ metaphor of a kaleido-
scope (James, 1890). Using this metaphor
James illustrates the ever-changing stream
of thoughts like a rotating kaleidoscope
where each momentarily stable pattern
constructed from multiple pieces (local
fields in our interpretation) is a speciously
presented thought (OM in our interpreta-
tion). Thus, the succession of phenomenal
images or thoughts is neurophysiologically
presented by the succession of discrete and
relatively stable OMs, which are separated
by rapid transitive processes (RTP), i.e.,
abrupt changes of OMs (Figure 1C). As it
has been shown experimentally, at the crit-
ical point of transition in mental states,
the OM undergoes a profound recon-
figuration which is expressed through
the following process (Fingelkurts et al.,
2000, 2003; Fingelkurts and Fingelkurts,
in press): The OM, which is comprised
from a set of local bioelectrical fields pro-
duced by transient neuronal assemblies
across several brain areas, rapidly loses
functional couplings and establishes new
couplings within another set of local bio-
electrical fields, thus demarcating a new
OM in the volumetric operational space-
time continuum of the brain (Figure 1C).
Thus, the presented model for OM
mediated succession of phenomenal
images or thoughts is one way of under-
standing how subjective time flow is
mentally (re)constructed beyond the
phenomenal horizons of “presence.”
Subjective time flow is not actually experi-
enced or “perceived,” rather it emerges as
the product of cognitive higher-order pro-
cesses operating on the OMs (Fingelkurts
et al., 2010). Such higher-order processes
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are also expressed in the form of com-
plex OMs, that not only superceedes
lower-level OMs, but also execute mem-
ory consolidation and retrieval operations
(Fingelkurts et al., 2003). Given such a
mechanism, the variation in subjectively
experienced speed of time could be also
explained. When the OMs’ average dura-
tion decreases, there are many more OMs
managing to sequence each other within
a given time unit. We suggest that this
overflow of OMs would be commonly
experienced as an acceleration of the
subjective time. Conversely, if the aver-
age duration of OMs was to increase,
then the subjective experience of time
would slow down. Below, we review some
experimental evidence in support of our
theorizing.
It is well known that certain psychoac-
tive agents create subjective time distor-
tions when administered. For example,
opioids can be used to prolong the sub-
jectively perceived duration of thought
(Galski et al., 2000). In agreement with OA
framework, it has been shown that opioids
do indeed increase the duration of the life-
span of neuronal assemblies (indexed by
EEG quasi-stationary segments) and limit
the synchronization between their opera-
tions, thus reducing the possible number
of OMs while increasing their life-span
(Fingelkurts et al., 2006).
Another important model, where
subjective experience could be easily
manipulated is hypnosis. In a neutral
hypnotic state the subject experiences an
altered background state of conscious-
ness different from the normal baseline
state of consciousness without the need of
suggestion (Kallio and Revonsuo, 2003).
This subjective state is characterized by
“emptiness” or “absorption” brought
about by dissociations in the cognitive
modules that are temporarily incapable of
normal communication with each other
(Gruzelier, 2000). Additionally, it has been
shown that the subjective sensation for
the passage of time is stretched during
hypnosis, because internal events are sub-
jectively slowed (Von Kirchenheim and
Persinger, 1991; Naish, 2001). Adhering
to the tenets of OA framework, these sub-
jective experiences should be reflected
in the operational architectonics of the
electromagnetic brain field. It was indeed
shown that the functional life-span of
neuronal assemblies (indexed by the
EEG quasi-stationary segments) was sig-
nificantly longer during hypnosis when
compared with the normal/baseline con-
scious condition (Fingelkurts et al., 2007).
It was further found that the number
and strength of synchronized operations
among different neuronal assemblies were
significantly lower during hypnosis than
during the baseline, thus limiting the
possibility for any OMs to emerge. As a
result they were absent (Fingelkurts et al.,
2007). Since OMs represent the forma-
tion of integrated conscious experiences,
their absence may explain such unusual
subjective experiences during hypnosis as
amnesia, timelessness, detachment from
the self, a “willingness” to accept distor-
tions of logic or reality, and the lack of
initiative or willful movement (Dietrich,
2003).
Dreaming is a special case where the
phenomenal world is realized in the brain
in its “pure form,” because it is nearly com-
pletely isolated from the external physical
world and the rest of the body. Dreams can
appear in REM as well as in the nonREM
sleep (Nir and Tononi, 2010). However,
the nature of dreams in REM and non-
REM sleep is different: during REM the
dreams are complex, organized, temporally
evolving, multimodal, and often bizarre
(Hobson et al., 2000), while in nonREM
the dreams are characterized by simple,
static or isolated image(s) or though(s),
usually of one modality (Noreika et al.,
2009). The OA prediction is that nonREM
dreams should be accompanied by short-
lived small neuronal assemblies and long-
lived large neuronal assemblies, and by
the significant increase of operational syn-
chrony (poor set of OMs) among different
neuronal assemblies in order to subjec-
tively present static images or thoughts. In
a pilot nonREM sleep study (Fingelkurts
and Fingelkurts, in press) we found that
nonREM dreams were indeed accompa-
nied by the small short-lived and large
long-lived neuronal assemblies, as well as
significant operational synchrony increase
in the OA organization of the brain. Future
research should establish the OA data for
REM sleep dreams.
This brief review of results supports the
suggested neurophysiological mechanism
(within the operational architectonics of
the human brain field) responsible for the
experiences of the “present moment,” past,
and future.
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